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Abstract: Multiple testing problems arise naturally in scientific studies because of
the need to capture or convey more information with more variables. The litera-
ture is enormous, but the emphasis is primarily methodological, providing numerous
methods with their mathematical justification and practical implementation. Our
aim is to highlight the logical issues involved in the application of multiple testing
adjustment.
1 Introduction
Let’s start by saying that dealing with multiple comparisons is tricky, perhaps not mathemati-
cally, but logically for sure. The wrapping of this problem should be labeled with at least two
warnings, one from Oscar Wilde: ‘the truth is rarely simple and never pure’ and the other from
Einstein: ‘as far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as
they are certain, they do not refer to reality’. Einstein’s statement was made in a lecture on
geometry in relation to experience, partly highlighting his insight that Euclidean geometry fails
to explain reality, so any branch of mathematics less intuitively obvious in its relation to reality
than geometry has an even larger gap to close.
Multiple comparisons arise naturally in most scientific studies because of the need to capture or
convey more information with more variables. But there are many steps taken during a scientific
process that also have multiplicity implications, such as deciding the appropriate scale (linear or
log), variables to be included in the analysis, subgroup analysis, etc.
First, the easy part: mathematically precise statements can be derived assuming the null hy-
potheses are true; in effect we are dealing with random numbers with no signal. At 5% sig-
nificance level, for every 100 tests we shall get 5 spuriously significant tests on average. Al-
ternatively, assuming independence and still under the null, it is virtually certain – probability
= 1− (1−0.05)100 = 0.994 – that the most significant result among the 100 tests will have a raw
P-value ≤ 0.05. This means that if we are na¨ıve we would be easily misled by false positives,
hence the usual warning about data dredging.
In practice, to account for multiplicity, one can simply adjust the P-values by multiplying each
by the number of tests (say M), or dividing the nominal significance level by M . This makes it
harder to declare significance. Using this so-called Bonferroni correction, we can guarantee that
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if we only reject hypotheses with adjusted P-value ≤ 0.05, say, then the probability of making
any false rejection among all tests is ≤ 0.05. To prove this, suppose we have M null hypotheses,
where a subset M0 are true; let F be the number of false rejections. Then
Prob(F > 0) = Prob(adjusted P ≤ 0.05, at least one of M0 hypotheses)
= Prob(P-value ≤ 0.05/M, at least one of M0 hypotheses)
≤ M0 × 0.05/M
≤ 0.05.
Due to its simplicity, this procedure is commonly used in practice. If we want to protect ourselves
against false positives, it seems reasonable to apply this procedure. The literature on multiple
testing is enormous and there are numerous alternative methods, many as improvements of the
Bonferroni correction, indicating that multiple-testing correction is taken seriously, and when
applied, it is mathematically straightforward.
Example 1: Cancer drug study. The following table shows the P-values in a
study to compare a metastatic cancer drug vs placebo for 10 patient characteristics.
The best raw P-value is 0.007 for the Karnofsky index (let’s keep it mysterious for
now), but when corrected using the Bonferroni method, nothing is significant at 5%
level. The last column actually gives an estimated number of false positives when we
consider the variable and those above it as significant, so we do not truncate it at 1.
We will use this quantity later.
Variables P-value 10×P-value
1 Karnofsky index 0.007 0.07
2 Body weight 0.013 0.13
3 Tricep skin-fold 0.091 0.91
4 Hemoglobin concentration 0.236 2.36
5 Erythr. sedimentation rate 0.350 3.50
6 Albumin in serum 0.525 5.25
7 Creatinine in serum 0.535 5.35
8 Bilirubin in serum 0.662 6.62
9 S-alkalinephosphatase 0.823 8.23
10 Alanine aminotransferase 0.908 9.08
Table 1: P-values in a study to compare a metastatic cancer drug vs placebo for 10 patient
characteristics. The third column is the Bonferroni-adjusted P-value that is (on purpose) not
truncated at 1.
2 Not everyone wants to adjust
Yet the statistical concerns about false positives are not shared universally among scientists. The
clearest objection was formulated by Rothman (1990), who declared ‘No Adjustments are Needed
for Multiple Comparisons’. Being the first Editor of the journal Epidemiology and author of a
widely used textbook, Rothman is one of the most influential and highly cited epidemiologists,
so it is worth understanding his arguments. Briefly, two non-mathematical presumptions are
needed for application of multiplicity adjustments:
• the ‘universal null hypothesis’, covering all hypotheses under consideration, is a reasonable
state of nature, so that chance does cause many unexpected findings, and
2
• no one would want to investigate further something that could be caused by chance.
He argued that in a scientific process these presumptions are not true, that ‘chance’ is not a
scientific explanation, so scientists should ‘grasp at every opportunity’ to understand unusual
findings, and that the possibility of being misled is part of the trial-and-error process of science.
It is still the case today that most statistical results in epidemiology and medical literature are
rarely adjusted for multiple comparisons, with notable exceptions in clinical trials and high-
throughput molecular studies; see more below. In clinical trials, multiplicity issues arise in, for
example, the choice of hypotheses to be tested, sidedness of the test, interim analyses during the
trial, main analysis plan, subgroup analyses after the trial, etc.
The US Food and Drug Administration’s Guidance for Industry: E9 Statistical Principles for
Clinical Trials stipulates that they should be addressed explicitly in advance. In particular, for
multiple comparisons, ‘adjustment should always be considered and the details of any adjustment
procedure or an explanation of why adjustment is not thought to be necessary should be set out
in the analysis plan.’
Furthermore, since September 2007, in the so-called FDAAA 801 Requirement, any clinical trial
of drugs or medical interventions that will seek FDA approval must be registered when the trial
begins (see: https://www.clinicaltrials.gov), hence limiting or avoiding completely the reporting
of unplanned analyses. Why are the strict guidelines not universally adopted in science in
general? Imagine asking scientists to register all the hypotheses and analysis plans -– including
interim analyses – in advance.
Example 1: Cancer drug study (continued). In the cancer drug study, suppose
we know nothing about the variables prior to the study, so for us all these variables
assume equal status. Then it would be naive to take the raw P-values seriously, thus
forcing us to accept the adjustment and the overall null result. But suppose prior
to collecting the data, because this is a study on end-stage metastatic patients, we
declared that the Karnofsky index, a generalized measure of functional performance,
was of primary interest, while the other variables were of secondary interest. Then,
no adjustment would be necessary for the Karnofsky index. Thus, as accepted in
clinical trials, in assessment of evidence our intention matters. This does not feel
controversial. We note that, for justifying the non adjustment, the primary interest
in the index does not require prior knowledge or data or anything sensible; in principle
we only need to declare it in advance.
Now suppose we accept we know nothing prior to the study, hence the multiplicity adjustment,
but another research group who is working on the Karnofsky index contacts us to share the data.
We agree to give them that variable only. Now, for them, it seems reasonable that no adjustment
is needed and to conclude that the Karnofsky index is statistically significant. So, here we have a
seeming paradox that, with the same data, two research groups can claim different evidence: one
group cannot claim significance, but the other can. But what if we contact them? Now it seems
the adjustment must be used, since we could have contacted any group working with the most
significant variable. This means the mechanism of contact becomes an issue, but in practice the
appearance of the ‘second group’ in the scene can of course be completely haphazard, e.g. via
a chance encounter at a party, a friend of a friend, etc. In this social contact, how do we keep
track of who brings up the topic first? It would be impossible to formalize such a process.
3
3 Single test
Surprisingly, the logical issue associated with the application of multiplicity adjustment arises
even when we only perform a single test (Berger and Berry, 1987). Suppose a client comes to
a statistician with a study (say with sample n = 100), and the statistician performs a single
test and obtains z = 2.1 (P-value = 0.036). It seems uncontroversial to claim significance at
α = 0.05. Yes, but wait . . . what did he plan to do if the result was not significant? Suppose, as
with other scientists, he planned to collect more data. So, his actual procedure is a sequential
test as follows:
1. Collect n = 100 samples and test if |z1| > c, if significant stop.
2. Otherwise, collect 100 more samples, and test if the overall |z2| > c.
To get an overall significance level α = 0.05., we must use c = 2.18, such that
Prob(|z1| > c) + Prob(|z1| ≤ c and |z2| > c) = 0.05.
So, the observed z = 2.1 is actually not significant! Again, the statistical significance is affected
not just by the data, but also by the intention of the scientist, but in this case it feels disturbing
because the second stage of the study is still only a thought. (Before the reader accuses this
example as perverse, adjusting for the intention here follows the FDA guideline on interim
analysis of clinical trials.)
4 Logical difficulties, Type-I and II errors
These examples highlight a generic logical question: what collection of tests do we want to apply
the adjustment to? To cover all tests relating to the same biological process? All tests in a
single paper? If the latter, then theoretically we can avoid multiplicity correction by splitting
the results into separate papers. The primary problem is that we are using the same statistic
(P-value) both as a measure of evidence in a specific dataset (statistical distance between the
hypothesis and the data) and as a measure of uncertainty (decision-making error rates) over
hypothetical repetitions of the study.
In the former, adjustment for multiplicity is not an issue, but in the latter it is. However, the
latter requires a precise setup of how the study repetitions are to be done, and here intention
matters, for example, in deciding which tests are to be included or prioritized. The examples show
that any test can legitimately belong to distinct collections with distinct repetition studies that
depend on the perspective of the experimenters. (This is not strange, e.g. a person may belong
to distinct clubs with conflicting rules.) In the drug example, different groups of researchers are
imagining different hypothetical experiments involving the Karnofsky index. In the single-test
example, on seeing the observed data, the statistician’s first reaction is to imagine hypothetical
repetitions involve one test, but the scientist’s intention involves hypothetical repetitions with
two tests. Whose perspective is correct?
In view of this logical difficulty, how are we to react to potentially conflicting conclusions from
unadjusted and adjusted analyses? Actually, we are unwittingly put into this corner by an
implicit demand that we make a decision. When a study is only performed once, i.e. the
hypothetical repetitions remain hypothetical, we are in a never-ending unsolvable logical puzzle
on how to decide. How do we break this puzzle?
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In clinical trials, for the key hypothesis, we break it simply by decree (e.g. following the FDA
Guidelines), in essence limiting or avoiding the issue by stating the hypothesis and analysis
methods in advance. Science does not follow such strict rules, but we need validation studies
to confirm interesting discoveries. Before further confirmation discoveries are considered provi-
sional, so, in contrast to clinical trials, it is not necessary to make a decision about the true
state of nature. However, we also note that, to confirm a discovery, it is not necessary to per-
form exactly the same experiment as before (i.e. the hypothetical repetitions). For example,
a discovery in an observational study in human will be substantially more credible if validated
biologically in mice, and vice versa.
Eventually, in treating a study as a screening tool to identify interesting discoveries, we have to
go back to the basic trade-off between type-I (false positive) and type-II (false negative) errors:
protecting against one will increase the other. Strict adherence to multiple-testing adjustment
protects against inflation of type-I errors and increases type-II errors, but who decides which
error is more important? The legendary investor George Soros reportedly said, “It’s not whether
you’re right or wrong [that is important], but how much money you make when you’re right
and how much you lose when you’re wrong.” It does not seem to make sense to be feel strongly
against one type of error vs the other independently of the context.
Different areas of science may treat multiplicity adjustment differently, perhaps depending on the
relative costs of the errors, their history/experience with the errors and abundance of potential
leads for discoveries. For example, molecular epidemiology went through the lamented candidate-
gene approach to complex diseases, roughly from 1980s up to early 2000s (Hirshhorn et al, 2002;
Chabris et al, 2012), where few findings were replicated.
Example 2: Publication bias and Winner’s curse. The human genome is a
rich source of variables/genes. For many complex phenotypes, suppose there is no
real effect or, more likely, the individual-gene effects are so tiny that the power of
fundable studies is too small to detect anything. Say there are 100 research groups
investigating different genes and phenotypes; each group is essentially generating
random numbers. At 5% level, there will be 5 lucky groups with significant results:
these are much more likely to get published, and then fail to replicate. If these
are really 100 distinct groups, what can we do about this problem? No system of
publication now can communicate so many negative findings to balance the false
positives, so the problem seems to be an inevitable price of the scientific process.
When high-throughput molecular studies, particularly the genome-wide association studies (GWAS)
came into the scene, a single study/paper routinely performs millions of tests of single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs), and the genome-wide significance threshold 5× 10−8 based on the Bon-
ferroni correction became the accepted method of dealing with the huge multiplicity problem.
One may argue correctly that we would be missing a lot of signals (type-II errors), but since the
field had seen a lot of wasted effort at replicating false leads during the candidate-gene era, the
consensus on the use of Bonferroni correction seems unchallenged.
The problem in molecular studies in the genomic era is that there are simply too many potential
leads, so one needs a method to limit them. Note, however, that the P-values for each phenotype
are usually adjusted separately, e.g. if there are 1M SNPs, then the 5× 10−8 is applied for each
phenotype regardless of the number of phenotypes, so the multiplicity adjustment is not followed
consistently.
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5 Flexible multiplicity adjustment
Multiple testing ideas are useful during an exploratory phase of a study. Goeman and Solari
(2011) identified three sensible requirements for a multiple correction procedure:
• not too strict: should allow possibilities of false rejections
• post-hoc: should allow choice after seeing the data
• flexible: should allow whatever results to pursue, not just the significant ones.
Instead of focusing on the probability of making any false rejections, which is too strict, we
can instead estimate and provide confidence lower-bounds for the number of true discoveries
(= correct rejections). To emphasize its post-hoc feature, they called their procedure ‘cherry
picking’. Recent developments, for example in false discovery rate (FDR) estimation, are also
in line with these requirements (e.g. Lee et al, 2012). The purpose is more to set realistic
expectations for further studies rather than making final decisions about the true state of nature.
Example 1: Cancer drug study (continued). Suppose this study was performed
on end-stage cachexic patients, which are characterized by severe wasting/loss of body
mass and functional impairment. The top 3 variables are then of special interest, but,
crucially, this interest can be decided post-hoc (after seeing the data). From the third
column (10×P-value), the estimated number of true discoveries is 3 − 0.91 ≈ 2 (Lee
et al, 2012). An application of the cherry-picking procedure (Goeman and Solari,
2011) gives 95% guarantee of at least 1 true difference from the top 3 findings, and
75% guarantee of at least 1 true difference from the second and third tests. So, even
if we do not want to specify any hypothesis in advance, the analysis indicates the
drug is worth studying further.
6 Conclusions
To conclude, we do not at all mean to sound skeptical of the use of multiplicity adjustment, espe-
cially when put in a flexible false discovery rate framework. However, we do want to emphasize
the nuances when adjustment is applied to real studies, and the constant need to consider the
type-I and type-II errors, whose relative costs are highly context specific. We highlight some log-
ical problems with its formal use when assessing scientific evidence, thus partly explain the lack
of universal acceptance. In areas of science where potential leads for discoveries are not abun-
dant and the true discoveries are rare but fundamental, formal multiplicity adjustment is not
the norm. On the other hand, there are areas that must pay close attention to the multiplicity
adjustment, e.g. clinical trials, where type-I errors can have enormous human or financial cost,
or high-throughput molecular studies with the flood of false positives when we use traditional
significance level.
Nature does not reveal its truths easily. Anyone in search of those ultimate truths will tolerate
certain false positives along the way. Healthy skepticism is a necessary default attitude in the
error-prone but self-correcting process of science. But there is a legitimate concern of false
positives when a scientific result is disseminated to the public. The scientists and the public
may have different relative costs of the type-I and type-II errors: the scientists may be more
concerned with missing a discovery (type-II), but the public does not like to be misled by false
positives. Also, the public may not have the patience or the kind of skepticism that accepts
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results as provisional. They are like observers that do not have sufficient background knowledge
– and attention span – to absorb conflicting accounts of an event faraway. So, conflicting findings,
say, about the effects of electromagnetic field or coffee or cancer screening, etc., will confuse the
public. The public position is similar to the one we mention above, where we put ourselves
unnecessarily into a corner by thinking that we have to decide one way or the other. The public
wants to know ‘the truth’ one way or the other, but the scientific answer comes in confusing
bits. The scientists themselves can live with the uncertainty of a provisional result or with a
variegated truth about effects. It is not obvious how to reconcile the scientific acceptance of
complex uncertainties and the public need for a simple message.
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